Ownership strategies in knowledge-intensive cross-border acquisitions: comparing Chinese and Indian MNEs by Scalera, Vittoria G. et al.
Ownership strategies in knowledge­
intensive cross­border acquisitions: 
comparing Chinese and Indian MNEs 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Scalera, V. G., Mukherjee, D. and Piscitello, L. (2018) 
Ownership strategies in knowledge­intensive cross­border 
acquisitions: comparing Chinese and Indian MNEs. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management. ISSN 1572­9958 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490­018­9616­6 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/79856/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10490­018­9616­6 
Publisher: Springer 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
    1 
Ownership strategies in knowledge-intensive cross-border acquisitions: Comparing 
Chinese and Indian MNEs 
Vittoria G. Scalera, University of Amsterdam 
Debmalya Mukherjee, University of Akron 
Lucia Piscitello, Politecnico di Milano 
Abstract 
Drawing on the comparative ownership framework, we perform a comparative analysis of 
Chinese and Indian multinational enterprises (MNEs)’ ownership strategies in knowledge-
intensive cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Specifically, we claim that due to their lower 
comparative ownership advantage, and the consequent higher information asymmetry, Chinese 
MNEs are more cautious (than Indian MNEs) in their ownership strategy. We rely on a dataset 
of acquisitions undertaken by high and medium-high tech Chinese and Indian MNEs 
worldwide during the period of 2000-2014. Results confirm that Chinese MNEs prefer lower 
equity control than their Indian counterparts. However, such a preference for lower equity 
decreases with higher home-host institutional distance and host country-specific previous 
experience. These factors do not seem to modify the ownership preference of Indian MNEs in 
the same way. 
 
 
Keywords Chinese and Indian MNEs, Cross-border acquisitions, Knowledge-intensive 
industries, Ownership choice, Comparative ownership advantage framework, Institutional 
distance, International experience.  
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Introduction 
In recent years the global economy has witnessed growing flows of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) from emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; 
Gaur, Kumar, & Singh, 2014). According to the World Investment Report, EMNEs’ share 
represents around 30% of world FDI outflows in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016), mainly due to the 
substantial relative increase of FDI conducted by Chinese and Indian MNEs. During the period 
1990-2015, Chinese outward FDI stock increased from $0.83 billion to $128 billion, while 
Indian outward FDI stock grew from $0.06 billion to $8 billion (UNCTAD, 2016).  
The bulk of Chinese and Indian outward FDI entails cross-border acquisitions (CBAs), 
which EMNEs use as conduits to quickly reduce the technological gap and augment their 
knowledge base by directly accessing and exploiting resources embedded in target firms (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005; Gaur, Ma, & Ding, 2018; Luo & Tung, 2007). Despite the growing 
literature on Chinese and Indian CBAs, much of what scholars have primarily attempted to 
understand is related to what drives such overseas investments, their outcomes, and the 
strategic goals to be achieved (e.g. Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, & Forsans, 2016; Nicholson 
& Salaber, 2013; Popli, Akbar, Kumar, & Gaur, 2016).  
However, while such CBAs contribute to a rapid internationalization process, they also 
uncover a range of important strategic choices that EMNEs need to consider in order to manage 
these complex situations (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013; Gaur et al., 2018). Acquirer’s decision 
about the level of equity bought in the target company (i.e., ownership choice) represents one 
of such strategic choices, as it is critical to several aspects of a firm’s strategy (Malhotra & 
Gaur, 2014), such as resource commitment, uncertainty, and risk exposure (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986). In this respect, the so-called issue of ‘light touch integration’, (i.e. when a 
relatively high degree of autonomy is left with the acquired company) an approach which is 
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extensively used by EMNEs in CBAs, especially the strategic asset-seeking ones (Liu & 
Woywode, 2013), has received scant attention. 
The existing literature has teased out several factors affecting ownership choices at the 
deal-, firm-, industry- and country-levels (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). Among the latter, cultural and institutional differences represent the 
most studied determinants, used primarily to proxy the level of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry faced by the acquiring firm in the host country (e.g., Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & 
Kundu, 2014; Contractor, Yong, & Gaur, 2016; Dow, Cuypers, & Ertug, 2016). However, 
much less is known about the role of country-specific advantages (CSAs) of the acquiring firms 
in explaining ownership choices in CBAs, even though CSAs have been widely studied by the 
literature on EMNEs to determine CBAs’ antecedents and location choices (Hobdari, 
Gammeltoft, Li, & Meyer, 2017; Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015; Sun, Peng, Ren, & 
Yan, 2012).  
In this paper, we aim to fill this void by shedding more light on the EMNEs’ ownership choice 
in knowledge-intensive CBAs by presenting a comparative analysis of Chinese vs. Indian 
MNEs’ behaviors with respect to their ‘light touch integration’ approach. This is in line with 
Luo, Sun, Wang (2011) who opine that “our understanding of comparative insights into various 
international business and management issues for firms from different countries remains 
incomplete especially when comparing firms from different developing countries” (p. 190). 
Specifically, we focus on two interrelated research questions: (1) How do the ownership 
strategies of Chinese and Indian MNEs differ in the context of knowledge-intensive CBAs?; 
(2) How do institutional distance between home and host country, and the acquiring firm’s host 
country-related experience differentially impact Chinese and Indian MNEs’ ownership 
strategies?  
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We build on the comparative ownership advantage framework suggested by Sun et al. 
(2012), which argues that strategic choices associated with CBAs by EMNEs can be explained 
by their comparative ownership advantages stemming from the combination of country- and 
firm-specific advantages. Accordingly, we contend that EMNEs’ strategic choices are driven 
by country-level factor endowments, dynamic learning and institutional factors. Including 
arguments from transaction cost economics (TCE) (e,g. Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), we also 
posit that in knowledge intensive CBAs, acquiring firms with lower comparative ownership 
advantage face higher information asymmetry, which in turn increases adverse selection issues 
and moral hazards.  These issues drive the acquiring firms to prefer lower share of equity in 
the target company.  
Additionally, we also consider the institutional distance and the previous experience of 
the acquirer (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Luo & Peng, 1999) as contingencies potentially 
affecting the information asymmetry associated with the different degree of comparative 
ownership advantage. In fact, both institutional distance and host country-specific experience, 
have been already shown to impact the level of equity bought in CBAs by influencing 
unfamiliarity (lack of knowledge about the host environment) and relational hazards (managing 
relationships from a distance) in foreign subsidiaries (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Pinto, Ferreira, 
Falaster, Fleury, & Fleury, 2017), but there is no consensus on their effect yet, especially in the 
context of emerging economies (De Beule, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014).  
We argue that in knowledge-intensive CBAs, Chinese MNEs suffer from higher 
information asymmetry, compared to Indian MNEs, mainly because of China’s lower 
comparative advantage in the more value-added sections of the value chain (e.g., marketing 
and knowledge services and R&D) and in corporate governance practices and accountability 
issues. Consequently, other things being equal, Chinese MNEs encounter greater difficulties in 
gathering information about the target companies and face more severe reputational problems 
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in the host country; thus, Chinese MNEs will be more likely to acquire a lower level of equity 
in the target company than their Indian counterparts. Additionally, Chinese MNEs will benefit 
more from target firm’s cooperation, which is favored by leaving equity shares to the target 
company, to incentivize information and knowledge sharing (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Meyer, 
Ding, Li & Zhang, 2014). However, such a preference for lower equity decreases when the 
host country is institutionally more distant (mainly in advanced economies with better 
institutional quality), and when the Chinese MNE has already maturated some experience in 
the host country.  
We test these theoretical arguments using a comprehensive deal-level dataset that 
collects knowledge-intensive CBAs undertaken by 244 high and medium-high tech Chinese 
and Indian MNEs targeting high and medium-high tech firms worldwide over the period 2000-
2014. Namely, our results confirm that Chinese MNEs experience more information 
asymmetry and lack of reputation in host countries (than Indian MNEs), thus preferring lower 
equity shares in target companies. However, such a preference will be less so when investing 
in more institutionally advanced countries, and when the acquiring MNEs already know the 
local environment (as they have previous experience). These factors do not seem to modify the 
ownership preference of Indian MNEs. 
Overall this work provides new evidence to the research that dwells at the intersection 
of emerging market firms, ownership strategies, and internationalization (Lebedev et al., 2015; 
Xie & Li, 2017; Zhu & Zhu, 2016) by focusing on knowledge-intensive CBAs of Chinese and 
Indian MNEs. This study also contributes to the literature on the comparative ownership 
advantage framework, by providing new empirical evidence and adding the contingency role 
of institutional distance and international experience (e.g., Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & 
Peng, 2013; Luo, Sun & Wang, 2011; Peng, 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Yang, Sun, Lin & Peng, 
2011). As such, comparative research on EMNEs in general, and between China and India in 
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particular, has so far received very limited attention (Lebedev et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2012). 
The most common approaches in the EMNEs’ literature have been to either consider the two 
countries in isolation (e.g., Popli & Sinha, 2014; Zhang et al., 2018) or put them “in the same 
bucket” (e.g., Asakawa & Som, 2008). While the first approach may reduce the generalizability 
of the results in other Asia Pacific emerging markets, the second one fails to identify 
comparative differences between the two countries, which we suggest form the basis of their 
firms’ differential internationalization behavior. Within this context, we discuss crucial 
differences associated with China and India’s comparative ownership advantages, which are 
designed by jointly considering country-level and firm-level characteristics. In doing so, our 
analysis provides new evidence on the phenomenon of ‘light touch integration’ adopted by 
EMNEs in their knowledge-intensive CBAs.  
Conceptual background 
The ownership choice in knowledge-intensive CBAs 
EMNEs have intensified their efforts in undertaking more knowledge-intensive CBAs to access 
sophisticated technology and know-how embedded in foreign companies. Knowledge-
intensive acquisitions imply the transfer of R&D resources, tangible and intangible assets, and 
tacit knowledge that can be effectively transferred and employed only if there is an efficient 
interaction between the involved firms (King, Slotegraaf & Kesner, 2008; Lebedev, et al., 
2015). Consequently, the choice of the ownership level acquired in the target company 
represents a key strategic decision that often determines the success of a knowledge-intensive 
CBA, as it has critical implications reflecting the acquirer’s resource commitment, control, risk 
exposure, and post-acquisition performance, as well as survival in the host country (Chari & 
Chang, 2009; Contractor et al., 2014; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Malhotra, Morgan & Zhu, 
2016). Specifically, the degree of ownership that the MNE acquires in the target company 
reflects the acquirer’s strategic behavior especially in terms of its uncertainty management 
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capacity and risk preferences as such decisions are long-term in nature and cannot be changed 
easily (Kedia & Bilgili, 2015).  
This is particularly true in the recurrent scenario of EMNEs acquiring firms overseas 
for knowledge-seeking purposes, as they enter culturally, technologically, and geographically 
distant locations. In addition to the liability of foreignness, EMNEs are also likely to face 
liability of origin (liability of emergingness in this context), given their lack of reputation, or 
even negative reputation, and low levels of legitimacy in foreign markets (De Beule et al., 
2014; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Mukherjee, Makarius, & Stevens, 2018; Perri, Scalera, & 
Mudambi, 2017). Such barriers can make the EMNE’s task of acquisition of legitimacy in the 
host-country market far more difficult particularly in the beginning, when the firm has yet to 
build up its own reputational capital, as it is usually the case with EMNEs seeking a foothold 
in Western markets (Kumar, Mudambi, & Gray, 2013; Mukherjee et al., 2018; Stevens, 
Makarius, & Mukherjee, 2015). 
According to the TCE, in such dissimilar environments, EMNEs may encounter severe 
information asymmetries and face high level of uncertainty that need to be addressed by 
appropriate ownership strategies in order to minimize ex ante problems of adverse selection 
and ex post problems of moral hazard (Stevens et al., 2015; Stevens & Makarius, 2015). On 
the one hand, incomplete information makes it difficult for the acquiring EMNE to pinpoint 
good-quality targets, and distinguishing them from the unsuitable targets, or the so-called 
“lemons” (Akerlof, 1970; Chari & Chang, 2009). On the other hand, post-acquisition, 
information asymmetry may lead to difficulties in fully enforcing contractual agreement and 
monitoring of target firm managers, who might behave opportunistically and thus hamper the 
transfer of knowledge and technology (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Chi, 1994). 
By leaving a share of ownership with the target firm (or non-dominant approach), the 
acquiring firms can mitigate this adverse selection problem, as they can (1) minimize their risk 
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exposure, (2) incentivize the sharing of accurate information about target business value, and 
(3) leverage the willingness of the target company to partially hold equity as a signal for the 
quality of the target (Chen & Hennart, 2004). Partial acquisitions also reduce ex post moral 
hazard risks, because they favor the preservation of some high-powered incentives, which is 
more likely to enable cooperation between the parties thereby ensuring a smooth transfer of 
knowledge resources (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Chi, 1994). Along these lines, we develop a 
conceptual framework that analyzes the effect of information asymmetry on the ownership 
choice in knowledge-intensive CBAs undertaken by EMNEs, by focusing on the acquiring 
firms’ CSAs as factors that affect information asymmetry.  
The comparative ownership advantage framework: Country- and firm-specific advantages  
The comparative ownership advantage framework has been proposed by Sun et al. (2012) to 
specifically explain CBA strategies by Chinese and Indian MNEs. Inspired by the comparative 
advantage theory of Ricardo (1817), and founded on the theoretical underpinnings of industry-
based view, organizational learning theory and institutional theory, these authors argue that 
EMNEs combine CSAs and firm-specific advantages (FSAs) to achieve a comparative 
ownership advantage at the firm level. This is in line with Porter (1990), who emphasizes that 
many aspects of an MNE’s competitive advantage may reside outside the firm, and country 
level factors such as a nation’s factor endowments may influence firm level competitiveness 
and behavior. Accordingly, scholars have recently argued that due to such home country-based 
advantages, firms from certain countries may benefit more and may perform certain activities 
better than firms from other countries (Landau, Karna, Richter, & Uhlenbruck, 2016). Lebedev 
et al. (2015) while explaining this framework note that EMNEs “create value by internalizing 
resources from different countries given their domestic factor endowments and firms’ 
capabilities (Rugman, 2005). For instance, China has a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing, and India in services. Therefore, Chinese firms have more cross-border 
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acquisitions in manufacturing, and Indian firms in services” (p. 654). They further point out 
that the basic tenets of comparative ownership advantage framework are appropriate to better 
understand EMNEs’ CBA related strategies. Consequently, we argue that due to the existence 
of such different comparative advantages between Chinese and Indian MNEs their ownership 
choices in CBAs will also be different.  
The context of China and India: A comparative framework 
Indian and Chinese MNEs undoubtedly share common characteristics related to their outward 
FDI. For instance, the role of government policies and market-supporting institutions in 
influencing their international expansion and local innovation, the propensity to undertake FDI 
in advanced countries in order to seek sophisticated technology and know-how, world-class 
brands and international legitimacy, or the preference for acquisitions and wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries are common for both countries’ EMNEs (Deng, 2009; Peng, 2012; Peng, 
Wang & Jiang, 2008; Piscitello, Rabellotti & Scalera, 2015). The Chinese carmaker Zhejiang 
Geely Holding Group’s acquisition of Sweden-based Volvo from Ford Motor Company is a 
case in point. Geely Holding hoped to access the technology and brand name along with a 
foothold in an advanced economy through this acquisition (New York Times, 2010). Similarly 
Huawei acquired Marconi to gain access to its world class technology and market position. 
Likewise, India’s Tata Group’s much vaunted acquisition of the luxury brands of Jaguar and 
Land Rover enabled the group to obtain important technological resources as well as legitimacy 
in the advanced markets. Along the same line, China-based Lenovo acquired IBM’s personal 
computer business to gain access to IBM’s world famous brand capital, their R&D and 
distribution capabilities, as well an entry to developed markets (Sun et al., 2012). Chinese Auto 
manufacturer Nanjing’s acquisition of MG Rover is also motivated by the former’s objective 
of gaining technological and brand resources from the latter. Similarly, Indian IT giant Wipro’s 
series of acquisitions is also aimed toward acquiring new capabilities and maintaining growth. 
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In 2011, Wipro acquired US-based SAIC, followed by the acquisitions of the Australian 
Promax Applications group in 2012 and U.S-based Opus CMC in 2013 (Bilgili, Kedia & 
Bilgili, 2016). Similarly, India-based Suzlon’s acquisition of RE Power Hansen has made it 
the fifth largest wind turbine manufacturer in the world while giving access to superior 
technology (Buckley et al., 2016). 
Yet, due to their inherent characteristics, factor endowments and trajectories, China and 
India are different (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Singh & Gaur, 2009), and so are their CSAs, which 
ultimately complement and interact with FSAs in building up the Chinese and Indian MNEs 
comparative ownership advantages. While India lags behind China in infrastructural 
development (both transport and electricity infrastructure) and market efficiency, it does have 
an edge in stronger private institutions and in a more trustworthy domestic financial market. 
Although economic reforms happened later in India (i.e., in 1991), when compared to China 
(i.e., in 1978), Chinese private institutions are relatively weaker and of lower quality. The main 
constraints related to market institutions experienced by China is the substantial interference 
of the government in the economy. The government still controls core companies in critical 
industries and owns the major banks in the domestic financial market (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, 
Liu & Voss, 2007). India has better quality private institutions due to less government 
interference in business sectors, an easier access to the stock market, and a stronger corporate 
governance system, which results in higher levels of corporate ethics and accountability. For 
example, Singh and Gaur (2009) argue that India has a business environment that is more 
conducive to private sector activities compared to China, due to less bureaucratic burdens, 
better anti-trust regulations, and a more efficient judicial system.  .  
In terms of factor endowments, India traditionally has an abundance of educational 
institutions and on-the-job training programs that supply good quality highly-skilled labor 
forces and managerial talent, a workforce with good English language skills, an active financial 
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sector, and efficient related institutions (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Kedia & Mukherjee, 2009). In 
contrast, the Chinese economy is traditionally manufacturing driven, efficiency oriented, and 
the national-industrial factor endowments are characterized by cheap labor and abundance of 
natural resources (Duamnu, 2012). Therefore, Chinese CBAs have traditionally favored Asian 
and African countries as their preferred destination choice, thereby leveraging high integration 
of their supply chains and targeting natural resource sectors dominated by oil and gas 
exploration, mining, and metal products (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Sun et al., 2012). In recent 
years, Chinese government has been particularly active in increasing and strengthening 
bilateral trade agreements with less developed but resource rich countries (e.g., African 
countries), to gain access to strategic raw materials in exchange of the provision of transport 
and communications infrastructure (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009).  
Conversely, Indian economy is more service oriented and highly competitive in 
software sectors (Mukherjee, Lahiri, Ash, & Gaur, 2018; Mukherjee, Gaur, & Datta, 2013), as 
well as in chemical and pharmaceutical industries. This is due to the presence of a vigorous 
domestic innovation system which is aptly sustained by the improvements in intellectual 
property protection standards, and continued investment in domestic science and engineering-
oriented educational institutions. For example, Indian pharmaceutical companies such as Dr. 
Reddy’s or Ranbaxy are now global players (Brandl, Mudambi & Scalera, 2015). As a result, 
Indian outward FDI has favored Europe and North America as their preferred locations, and 
has targeted high-tech industries involving knowledge-intensive assets and highly valued 
brands (e.g., Tata’s acquisition of Tetley tea) (Bilgili et al., 2016; Mukherjee, Makarius, & 
Stevens, 2018; Sun et al., 2012).  
Finally, due to the extent of the state control of Chinese economy, the home institutional 
environment, together with historical and political country profile, has played a crucial role on 
the openness of the domestic market and commercial relations with foreign countries. The 
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Chinese “open-door policy”, government liberalization, and the implementation of the “go 
global” policy have provided China with a comparative advantage in international trade and 
FDI openness (Buckley et al., 2007). However, China’s economic and historical ties are 
particularly strong with other Asian and African developing countries, while India as a 
commonwealth country, has long enjoyed historical and economic influence from the West 
(Nicholson & Salaber, 2013).  
Hypotheses development 
Level of control in CBAs: Comparing Chinese and Indian MNEs  
We now develop conceptual arguments to establish that lower comparative ownership 
advantage, originating from different combination of country-level and firm-level 
characteristics, is associated with higher information asymmetry in CBAs, which ultimately 
leads to the preference of lower equity share in the target company.  
Both Chinese and Indian MNEs involved in knowledge-intensive CBAs need to collect 
comprehensive information about the target company and its relative industry and country 
environments in order to be able to correctly assess the value of the target firm. In doing so, 
acquirers look for credible information leveraging formal and informal networks. This process 
is particularly important when acquirers are not familiar with the host-country institutional and 
cultural environment, and when the value of the deal is dependent upon  complex technology 
and high amounts of tacit knowledge, that are difficult to appraise in the absence of disclosed 
information and scant technical competences (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Reuer & Koza, 2000;). 
Thus, the difficulty and costs of collecting reliable information are accentuated with greater 
information asymmetry (Portes & Rey, 2005), which in turn increases with lower comparative 
ownership advantages of the acquiring MNEs (Sun et al., 2012). We posit that acquirers with 
lower comparative ownership advantages suffer from higher risk of adverse selection and 
moral hazard due to the considerable information asymmetry. In sum, acquirers with lower 
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comparative ownership advantages face more difficulties when trying to get in contact with 
key informants in host markets, pinpoint valuable foreign targets, write complete contracts in 
unfamiliar environments, manage the post-acquisition integration, and incentivize the 
knowledge share between the involved parties.  
Based on the aforementioned logic, we argue that Chinese MNEs suffer from higher 
information asymmetry owing to their CSAs. 1 First, China’s competitive advantage in the 
lower-end of the value chain makes it more difficult for Chinese MNEs to access valuable 
information and identify potential target firms in cross-border knowledge-intensive industries 
as they lack legitimacy and valuable links with suppliers and customers in such industries. In 
contrast, Indian MNEs can better leverage their home-country’s superior position in the more 
profitable section of the value chain (e.g., marketing and knowledge services and R&D) in 
gathering information and participating  in crucial informal networks (Contractor, Kumar & 
Dhanaraj, 2015). For Indian MNEs, firsthand access to such information channels is also 
facilitated by India’s higher levels of multinational communication skills and fewer obstacles 
for global integration, especially in Western markets (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Second, the 
governmental interference in the Chinese economy, the lower quality of their private 
institutions, driven by weaker corporate governance practices and accountability procedures, 
increase the severe (negative) reputational problems leading to higher suspicion faced by 
Chinese MNEs in host-country environments (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). These factors 
translate into higher information asymmetry faced by Chinese MNEs while treading the paths 
of international acquisitions. In comparison, Indian MNEs can leverage the comparative 
ownership advantage associated with higher country-level standards regarding corporate ethics 
and management capabilities - especially in knowledge-intensive sectors - (Singh & Gaur, 
                                                        
1 It is important to note that in H1 we do not take into account whether the acquisition was made in a developed 
or emerging market.  
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2009), which enable them to better mitigate the information asymmetry by establishing trust-
based relationships with the foreign target firms.   
Therefore, compared to Indian MNEs, Chinese MNEs will prefer to acquire a lower 
equity share in the target company in order to reduce such issues by adopting a softer entry 
mode. In fact, Chinese MNEs will benefit more from partial ownership as it favors the ex ante 
and ex post cooperation with the foreign firm, providing more incentives to share accurate and 
complete information and knowledge. It also allows the target company to enjoy greater 
autonomy and perceive the acquisition as less threatening (hence, light-touch). All these are 
important factors in reducing information asymmetry and promoting an effective learning 
process (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Meyer et al., 2014). Lower equity in the target firm may also 
reduce the risk exposure, which is particularly higher for Chinese MNEs in the post-acquisition 
phase, where they lack internationally savvy managerial talent capable of effectively dealing 
with the complexities of integration and severe moral hazard problems (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2001; Peng, 2012). This is less so in the case of Indian MNEs, who, owing to their home 
environment, already possess superior resource bundling skills, and higher levels of absorptive 
capacity (Bilgili et al., 2016; Buckley et al., 2016). Accordingly, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1. In knowledge-intensive CBAs Chinese MNEs will acquire a lower share of 
equity in the target company, compared to their Indian counterparts. 
 
The role of institutional distance between home and host countries 
Institutional distance, which refers to the extent of difference in institutional environments 
between the acquirer country and target country, is a crucial factor in CBAs (Kedia & Bilgili, 
2015; Malhotra, Lin & Farrell, 2016). On the one hand, some studies show a negative 
relationship between institutional distance and level of control sought in CBAs (Hennart & 
Larimo, 1998; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). This set of studies find that 
when home and host country institutional environments are similar, MNEs tend to acquire 
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higher levels of equity in the target company driven by a sense of familiarity and less perceived 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. On the other hand, a different set of empirical findings 
show that institutional distance may be positively associated with the level of equity sought in 
foreign activities. For example, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue that distant institutional 
environments encourage full ownership, as larger distances might represent a barrier to transfer 
organizational practices from the headquarters to the foreign subsidiary.  
Recently, while reviewing previous research on the impact of institutional distance on 
ownership choice in the context of emerging markets, De Beule et al. (2014) point out that 
most of the existing work has only considered the magnitude of distance, and the measures 
have been usually applied to advanced country MNEs investing in emerging or less developed 
countries (e.g. Contractor et al., 2014, 2016). Analyzing the opposite situation, (i.e. EMNEs 
investing in relatively more advanced countries) the authors claim that EMNEs do not 
generally need to rely on the local partner to reduce uncertainty, as a distant institutional 
environment in their case usually constitutes a more advanced institutional context, i.e. a much 
more stable and less risky surrounding environment, compared to their home country. In such 
situations, EMNEs do not necessarily need to forsake higher equity shares to reduce uncertainty 
and to be able to identify relevant information and good investment opportunities. Therefore, 
EMNEs are likely to acquire higher equity share in the target company when the home-host 
institutional distance is relatively high (De Beule et al., 2014; Liou, Chao & Yang, 2016).  
Within the context of Chinese and Indian knowledge-intensive CBAs, we posit that the 
greater is the institutional distance, the better is the foreign institutional context experienced 
by the Chinese and Indian acquiring companies. As a result, acquiring firms face lower 
information asymmetry in the host country, which ultimately reduces the need for partial 
ownership. In such situations, the target companies are generally located in more advanced and 
institutionally developed countries, where the Chinese and Indian acquiring firms can more 
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easily gather reliable information to (ex-ante) assess the target value, and (ex-post) enforce 
contractual agreements due to host-country’s higher levels of transparency, more efficient 
monitoring systems, and less uncertain legal practices (Aybar & Ficici, 2009).  
However, as we have argued at the outset, compared to India, China is characterized by 
a relatively poorer and idiosyncratic institutional framework largely influenced by government 
intervention and weaker corporate governance regulations (Singh & Gaur, 2009). Thus, 
Chinese acquirers suffering from lower comparative ownership advantages and facing higher 
levels of information asymmetry will benefit more from the better institutional context 
experienced abroad, compared to their Indian counterparts. Consequently, we posit that the 
positive effect of institutional distance on the share of equity acquired in knowledge-intensive 
CBAs is stronger for Chinese MNEs, compared to their Indian counterparts. The former, in 
fact, suffer from higher information asymmetry, and as such they are more positively affected 
by the mitigating effect of the institutional distance. Thus, our second hypothesis states as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2. In knowledge-intensive CBAs, the institutional distance with the host country 
will affect more positively the share of equity bought in the target company by Chinese MNEs, 
compared to their Indian counterparts.  
 
The role of previous experience in the host country  
Previous studies show that prior experience helps the acquiring firm to reduce uncertainty and 
deal with ex ante as well as ex post issues experiences in CBAs (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; 
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). Specifically, the literature on MNEs entry mode has shown that 
the previous experience in the host country is likely to lower the perceived risk and costs 
associated with the cross-border investments and reduce the perceived distance between the 
local partner and the acquiring firm (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse & Lien, 2007). Experience 
within the same host country is likely to mitigate those issues arising from cultural and 
knowledge distance and reduce information asymmetries providing access to context-specific 
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local knowledge. For example, past experience in the same host country may entail knowing 
the various important factors, such as legal codes, pertinent regulations, and normative 
practices that positively impact efficient and effective transfer of resources and knowledge 
during a subsequent acquisition (Barkema & Schijven, 2008).  
In addition, in line with the internationalization process model (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977), Powell and Rhee (2016) find that prior experience increases confidence in the face of 
institutional differences and enhances the propensity to adopt majority-owned structures in the 
foreign subsidiary. The authors show that experience in institutionally different contexts leads 
to a deep understanding of the way to act and do business within these environments, and 
reduces the need to rely on the local partner for legitimacy and access to networks. Also, Li, 
Yang and Yue (2007) show that the level of equity sought increases with the number of already 
established subsidiaries in the host country owing to the cumulated legitimacy in the host-
country community.  
Knowledge-intensive CBAs are characterized by high information asymmetries where 
the acquisition outcomes are mainly dependent upon the ability of the acquiring company to 
reliably appraise the target firm’s technologies and to learn from the target company (Chari & 
Chang, 2009). Thus, in such CBAs the role of host-country experience is particularly salient. 
Prior host-country experience reduces information asymmetry by means of a twofold 
mechanism (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). First, the host-country presence facilitates the access to 
relevant local information providers (e.g. other buyers, customers and suppliers) to gain 
information for the assessment of target firms’ assets. Second, it reduces the post-acquisition 
integration issues and favors collaboration between the acquiring and target company and helps 
the learning process by leveraging cumulated familiarity with the host-country environment.  
Therefore, we argue that Chinese and Indian MNEs undertaking knowledge-intensive 
CBAs will benefit from prior experience in the host country as they may be better positioned 
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to access information, better prepared to anticipate the sources of uncertainty, and are more 
able to manage the challenges associated with integration issues in the post-acquisition phase. 
Thus, prior host-country experience is likely to reduce the need for partial ownership choices, 
and promote the acquisition of higher levels of equity. 
However, we contend that previous host-country experience will help Chinese MNEs, 
more than the Indian ones, in acquiring higher equity shares in knowledge-intensive CBAs. 
This is because that from a comparative ownership advantage perspective, Chinese MNEs are 
less experienced in investing in Western countries through knowledge-intensive CBAs than 
Indian acquirers, and consequently less knowledgeable about the managerial practices that are 
essential in dealing with such complex situations (Sun et al., 2012). Thus, they will try harder 
to maximize their host country-specific learning experience. Additionally, given the higher 
information asymmetry faced by Chinese MNEs in entering foreign and distant environments, 
they will value their prior host-country experience more, as such learning may help them (at 
least partially) counterbalance the negative reputation in the host country.  
Accordingly, we expect that the previous experience in the host country will be more 
pronounced and valuable for Chinese MNEs (than for Indian MNEs), and it is likely to 
differentially influence their choice of equity levels in CBAs. Specifically, our Hypothesis 3 is 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 3. In knowledge-intensive CBAs, previous international experience related to the 
host country will affect more positively the share of equity bought in the target company by 
Chinese MNEs, compared to their Indian counterparts.  
 
Methodology 
Data and sample  
Previous studies have empirically highlighted that investments aimed at sourcing knowledge 
are particularly relevant in high-tech manufacturing industries (Cloodt, Hagedoorn & van 
Kranenburg, 2006), especially in case of EMNEs investing abroad (Buckley et al., 2016). We 
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define knowledge-intensive acquisitions as those where both the acquiring and the target 
company operate in high or medium-high technology industries. To identify such industries we 
rely on the Eurostat-OECD (2007) classification, and we include in our study five two-digit 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) manufacturing industries as high or medium-high 
technology industries: chemicals (28), computer equipment (35), electronics (36), 
transportation (37), instruments (38) (for a similar approach, see King et al., 2008). This 
enables us to conservatively and objectively identify acquisitions mainly aimed at seeking 
knowledge or technology.  
The original sample, drawn from the Thomson OneBanker database (Thomson Reuter), 
includes all knowledge-intensive CBAs completed during the period 2000-2014 by Chinese 
and Indian firms. From Thomson OneBanker we also collected deal-level and firm-level 
variables. This database has been widely used in other empirical studies on acquisitions (e.g. 
Jory & Ngo, 2014; Sun et al., 2012), and it provides access to the most complete coverage of 
CBAs worldwide offered by secondary sources. Data for other variables were gathered from 
different sources as reported below.  
The final sample is the result of a careful screening conducted manually by the authors 
on the initial population of deals. To be specific, we excluded: (1) transactions not completed, 
(2) deals undertaken by individual or unknown investors, (3) investments with undisclosed 
acquirer and/or target, and (4) investments in which the acquirer is a sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF) or the global ultimate owner (GUO) is not from China or India. After eliminating those 
observations with missing values for any of the variables (discussed subsequently), our final 
sample includes 244 acquisitions2. This sample features 79 acquisitions (32%) undertaken by 
                                                        
2 The initial sample was composed by 425 Chinese and Indian knowledge-intensive acquisitions. Considering the 
significant amount of missing data especially for firm-level variables, the final sample is smaller compared to the 
initial one. Therefore, we performed three different chi2 tests on three sample dimensions, i.e. host countries, 
acquirer sectors and target sectors, using the original sample. The tests show that there are no statistically 
significant differences between the distribution of the sample firms across the three dimensions and the 
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Chinese companies and 165 (68%) by Indian companies. Table 1 shows the sectoral 
distribution of the acquisitions in our sample, by industrial sector and home country of the 
acquiring firm. While Indian acquisitions are primarily concentrated in the chemical sector 
(115 out 165, corresponding to the 69.7%), Chinese acquisitions are more homogeneously 
distributed in two industries, i.e. electronics and computer equipment (34 and 20 out of 79, 
43% and 25.3%, respectively).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Deals included in our sample involve 44 target countries distributed worldwide, so there is a 
meaningful variation in the study. Table 2 lists the target countries involved distinguishing 
them between advanced and emerging economies.3 It shows that both Chinese and Indian 
MNEs prefer to invest in the USA, while the second most chosen target country is Germany 
for Chinese firms and the United Kingdom for Indian firms.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Variables 
Dependent variable Equity ownership is measured as a continuous variable, with values 
ranging in our sample from 6% to 100% (corresponding to full acquisition), and an average 
value of 84%, showing that Chinese and Indian MNEs tend to prefer majority acquisitions 
when undertaking knowledge-intensive CBAs (see Table 4). We obtained this information 
from the Thomson OneBanker database.  
Independent variables The first independent variable is the dummy Chinese, which is equal to 
1 if the acquiring company is an MNE headquartered in China, and 0 otherwise (i.e. the 
acquiring company is an MNE headquartered in India). We obtained this information from the 
Thomson OneBanker database. 
                                                        
corresponding distribution of the population from which the sample was drawn (p-values: 0.36, 0.26 and 0.18, 
respectively). 
3 We use the classification provided by the International Monetary Fund for categorizing the target countries 
included in the sample.  
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To test Hypothesis 2, we needed a measure of Institutional distance between the home 
and the host countries. Institutional distance was computed (for the year previous to the deal) 
by focusing on the market-related dimension of institutions, which is likely to be the most 
relevant institutional aspect taken into consideration by a foreign firm interested in doing 
business in a foreign country. In particular, following previous works (e.g. De Beule et al., 
2014; Liou et al., 2016; Popli et al., 2016) we rely on the 9 items of the Index of Economic 
Freedom 4 developed by the Heritage Foundation in partnership with the Wall Street Journal 
(Kane, Holmes & O’Grady, 2007). Specifically, we consider the following items: business 
freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, proprietary rights and freedom from corruption. A score ranging 
between 0 and 100 is associated with each item for the 46 countries, i.e. 44 host countries and 
2 home countries, included in our dataset. The distance between China (or India) and each host 
country is computed by using a procedure similar to Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) (for an 
analogous approach, see also Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Next, in order to test our Hypothesis 
3, we introduce the variable International experience, which refers to firm’s previous 
experience in the host-country. Following previous studies (e.g. Malhotra & Gaur, 2014), this 
is measured through the dummy variable International experience, that takes the value of 1 if 
the company had already undertaken at least another CBA in the same host country in the 
previous 10 years, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables. We control for several characteristics at firm-, deal- and country- level that 
have been included in similar studies on ownership choices in cross-border acquisitions, and 
may affect share equity choices (e.g. Chari & Chang, 2009; Contractor et al., 2014; Liou et al., 
2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Powell & Rhee, 2016).  
                                                        
4 The items of the Economics Freedom Index are actually 10, but the tenth, i.e. labor freedom, is not employed 
as it has been made available only since 2005, while the deals included in our sample range from 2000 to 2014.  
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At the country level, we control for macroeconomic factors that may influence CBAs 
and acquiring firm’s decisions. In particular, we include the target country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) and GDP difference, which represents the difference in value of the GDP 
between the acquirer and the target countries. A log transformation is used due to the skewed 
distribution of the variable. Data were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators 
database. In order to account for host country-specific effects we include three sets of dummies 
to distinguish whether the acquisition targeted Europe, the USA, or other emerging economies 
(i.e., non-European emerging economies), i.e. Host country_EU, Host country_USA, Host 
country_other emerging. Data about target firms’ locations come from the Thomson 
OneBanker database. 
Since our study utilizes a multi-host multi-home sample, we considered several 
measures of informal institutional distance5 between the home and the host country to account 
for the different dimensions of psychic distance stimuli, some of them particularly relevant in 
the case of knowledge-intensive FDI (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). In fact, informal 
institutional differences may affect the nature and degree of interaction between individuals, 
and the extent to which working routines and competences can be transferred from one country 
to another (Hofstede, 1980). Uncertainty avoidance distance is employed as measure of 
cultural distance following prior research (e.g. Chari & Chang, 2009; Contractor et al., 2014; 
Kogut & Singh, 1988). It refers to the distance between uncertainty avoidance levels of the 
acquirer and the target country, thus measuring the cultural attitude toward uncertainty. The 
measure is computed by using a procedure similar to Kogut and Singh (1988) for each CBA. 
The uncertainty avoidance indices were obtained from the Hofstede Centre (www.http://geert-
                                                        
5  Following Gaur and Lu (2007) and Contractor et al. (2014) we distinguish between formal and informal 
institutions. In particular, we call simply institutions the former, which relate to rules, law and practices, while 
informal institutions refer to values, norms and traditions of culture, language and society (North, 1973).  
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hofstede.com/the-hofstede-centre.html) 6 . In addition to cultural distance, following the 
approach of Malhotra and Gaur (2014), we also calculated Religion distance and Language 
distance. Specifically, according to Dow and Karunaratna (2006), the latter were measured by 
the difference between the home and the host country for each scale. Religion may be a factor 
that arguably needs to be considered as empirical evidence has already shown its impact on the 
manner in which people interact and do business. Likewise, language has been recognized as 
a key component of psychic distance and one of the dimensions influencing international 
expansion patterns (Welch, Welch & Marschan-Piekkari, 2001). The data comes from Douglas 
Dow’s website (https://sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch/home/scales).  
For firm-level controls, we employ several measures following the existing 
international business (IB) literature on acquisitions and ownership choice. Namely, we control 
for bankrupt (Bankrupt target) and public target firms (Public target), as they may be less 
expensive to be bought and therefore positively correlated with acquisition of higher shares 
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). We use SOE that is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquiring company is state-owned, and 0 otherwise, to control for the effect of state control on 
the acquiring behavior that may lead to deviate from pure market strategies (Cui & Jiang, 
2009). We also include Size, measured by the logarithm of the assets value of the acquiring 
company as at the previous year of the deal, as literature suggests that larger firms may have 
more resources available to acquire higher share of equity in the target company (Chari & 
Chang, 2009). Again, we use a log transformation to correct skewedness in the data. Following 
prior work by Reuer and Koza (2000) and Chari and Chang (2009) on information 
asymmetries, we include the dummy variable Industry relatedness, which takes the value of 1 
if the acquiring and the target companies are from the same industry, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                        
6 In case the index of host country was not available, we assigned these countries the score of others supposed to 
have similar institutional environment (for a similar approach, see Quer et al., 2012). 
    24 
Specifically, we compare the primary SIC codes of the acquiring and the target firms at three-
digit level, and assume that related CBAs show on average a higher level of control. We also 
control for the payment method as it affects the information asymmetry, introducing the 
variable Cash payment, which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer used at least partially 
cash to pay for the acquisition, and 0 when the transaction had no cash payment.  
For industry-specific effects, we introduce four sectoral dummies (Chemicals, 
Computer Electronic equipment, and Transportation with Instruments as the benchmark) 
based on the acquirer’s 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes. All industry-level data were obtained from 
the Thomson OneBanker database. Finally, we control for the years of the financial crisis by 
adding two dummy variables for acquisitions in 2006 or 2007 (Year t for t = 2006, 2007). As 
we pool data across 2000-2014, these time dummies enable us control for the change of 
worldwide business environment over time, and in particular the effect of financial crisis on 
the target firm value on the market, which might affect acquisition price and the acquisition 
behavior of the acquiring firms. 
Estimation strategy 
Since our dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, we employed a Tobit regression 
analysis, as an ordinary least squares regression model would report biased and inconsistent 
estimates. This methodology enables us to account for the censoring of the dependent variables 
(Greene, 1993), and it has been widely used in prior entry mode studies investigating the share 
of equity ownership (e.g. Chari & Chang, 2009; Liou et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). 
We assumed that observations are independent across acquiring firms but not necessarily 
within acquiring firms. Following this approach, we allowed for intra-group correlation of 
standard errors, which affects the standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators, but not the estimated coefficients.  
Results  
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Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of the study variables. The table shows a 
number of correlations at levels high enough to raise questions about multicollinearity. Thus, 
to assess the potential threat of collinearity, we estimated the variance inflation factors (VIF). 
We find no VIF is greater than 4.12, which is significantly lower than the commonly used 
maximum VIF thresholds of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 displays the results of the Tobit regressions, with Model 1 using only control variables, 
while Model 2 includes Institutional distance and International experience, and Model 3 
introduces also the main independent variable, i.e. Chinese, key to test Hypothesis 1. The three 
models produced statistically significant results (F = 5.97 and p<.01 in Model 1, F = 5.98 and 
p<.01 in Model 2, F = 5.85 and p<.01 in Model 3). 
Hypothesis 1 states that Chinese firms involved in knowledge-intensive CBAs will acquire a 
lower share of equity in the target company, compared to their Indian counterparts. As the 
dummy variable Chinese in Model 3 is negative and significant (p<.05), our Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. In particular, the effect of the dummy Chinese is quite relevant, as its coefficient is 
-38.87, which indicates that the predicted value of the equity ownership (equal to 100% for full 
acquisitions) is on average almost 39% lower for Chinese CBAs than for Indian CBAs. With 
respect to the other key explanatory variables in Hypotheses 2 and 3, Institutional distance7 
seems to have a positive impact on the share of equity acquired in the target company, but it is 
not statistically significant, confirming the mixed empirical results of previous works. 
Conversely, and in line with the existing theory and empirical evidence, the coefficient of 
International experience is positive and significant (p<.05 and p<.1 in Model 2 and 3, 
respectively). As to the results shown in Model 3, International experience has a considerable 
                                                        
7 In our sample the direction of the institutional distance is positive in 97% of the observations, indicating that 
knowledge-intensive acquisitions undertaken by Chinese and Indian firms are targeting more institutionally 
advanced countries, as hypothesized in our theoretical framework. 
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impact on the predicted value of the equity ownership. Firms with previous international 
experience acquire on average 18.18% more of equity ownership compared to their 
counterparts with no international experience. Regarding control variables, we find positive 
and significant coefficients for GDP (p<.1 in Model 2 and p<.05 in Model 3), GDP difference 
(p<.05 in Model 1 and p<.1 in Model 2 and 3) and Host_country EU (p<.1 in Model 1 and 3 
and p<.05 in Model 2. Language distance turns out to be negative and significant (p<.05) only 
in Model 1, while in Model 2 and 3 Religion distance prevails showing a negative in significant 
coefficient (p<.1 and p<.05, respectively). The coefficient of Bankrupt target and Public target 
are both significant (p<.01), but with opposite signs, i.e. the first positive and the second 
negative. SOE presents a negative and significant (p<.001 in Model 1 and Model 2, and p<.1 
in Model 3) coefficient. The coefficient for Size is significant (p<.05) and negative. In all the 
models the coefficient for Host country_USA, Host country_emerging, Uncertainty avoidance 
distance Industry relatedness, Cash payment and Crisis do not come out significant. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3 we used the models presented in Table 5, where Model 2 and 3 
report the results of the Tobit regressions on the split samples, i.e. differentiating between 
knowledge-intensive CBAs made by Chinese vs. Indian firms, respectively. Model 1 replicates 
the Tobit regression on the whole sample, just to make results’ comparison easier.8 We decided 
to use this “split samples” approach both because it is in line with previous studies (e.g. Yang 
et al., 2011), and as it enables us to show more clearly how institutional distance and previous 
international experience differently affect Chinese and Indian firms’ ownership decisions.  
                                                        
8 It may be worth noting that, compared to the models presented in Table 4, we included less control variables. 
This is due to the smaller number of observations in the two split samples that causes a reduction in the degrees 
of freedom of the models. However, to avoid any potential omitted variable bias we run further robustness checks 
on the full model specification and results are in line with the ones presented in Table 6 (results are available upon 
request from the authors).  
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Hypothesis 2 and 3 argue that the institutional distance with the host country and 
previous international experience, respectively, have a stronger positive effect on the share of 
equity acquired by the Chinese MNEs (compared to the Indian ones). The Chinese Model (2) 
shows that the coefficient of Institutional distance and International experience are both 
positive and significant (p<.05), while the same coefficients in the Indian Model (3) are positive 
but not statistically significant, and also smaller in magnitude. More specifically, results on the 
Chinese sample show that one unit increase in the Institutional distance entails an increase of 
almost 5% in the predicted value of the share of equity acquired by Chinese MNEs. The effect 
of International experience is even stronger, as on average Chinese firms with previous 
international experience acquire 37.48% more of equity ownership compared to their domestic 
counterparts with no international experience. This evidence provides support to our 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, corroborating our belief that institutional distance and previous 
international experience differently impact the ownership choices by Chinese and Indian firms.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We also examined the sensitivity of our results to different changes. Specifically, we 
run our models dropping deals involving acquisitions of less than 5% equity (see also Chari & 
Chang, 2009), controlling for existing trade agreements between the host and the home country, 
and for previous experience in majority control acquisition, and clustering the errors by target 
countries. We obtained results in line with the ones presented in Table 4 and 5 (results are 
available upon request from the authors). Finally, we performed our models using an 
alternative empirical technique, i.e. ordered probit regressions. More specifically, similarly to 
Chari and Chang (2009) we categorized our dependent variable, Equity ownership, creating 
three logically ordered categories of (1) 100%, (2) greater than, or equal to, 50% but below 
100%, and (3) below 50%. As shown in Table 6 and 7, the results of the ordered probit 
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regression analyses are similar to our results obtained by the Tobit regression analyses (Table 
3 and 4). 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
Discussion and conclusion  
In this work we present a comparative analysis of Chinese and Indian MNEs’ ownership 
choices in knowledge-intensive CBAs. Our contention is that the substantial dissimilarities in 
the comparative ownership advantages between Chinese and Indian MNEs play a significant 
role in shaping their CBAs’ ownership choices. Accordingly, we develop a conceptual 
framework that examines the relationship between acquiring firms’ comparative ownership 
advantage and information asymmetry, with the aim to ultimately explain the different levels 
of equity acquired in knowledge-intensive CBAs. More specifically, we argue that in 
knowledge intensive CBAs Chinese MNEs prefer to acquire lower equity in the target 
company, compared to Indian MNEs. This is due to the higher information asymmetry faced 
by Chinese MNEs in such complex situations, which relates to the difficulty and costs in 
gathering and assessing reliable information and knowledge due to their lower comparative 
advantage. Therefore, by leaving higher shares of equity in the target companies, Chinese 
MNEs are more likely to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard concerns as they can 
then rely on acquired companies’ cooperative behavior.   
Our findings, based on multiple analyses on a sample of 244 knowledge-intensive 
CBAs undertaken by Chinese and Indian MNEs between 2000 and 2014, provide support to 
our theoretical arguments. However, we also show that the role of important country- and firm-
level contingences, such as institutional distance and host-country experience, is not the same 
in mitigating information asymmetry under different extent of comparative ownership 
advantage. Namely, we find that institutional distance and previous host-country-related 
experience reduce the information asymmetry faced by Chinese MNEs (i.e. under lower 
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comparative ownership advantages), which in turn increase their share of equity, while the 
same factors seem to have a relatively weaker effect in the Indian case (i.e. under higher 
comparative ownership advantages).   
Theoretical Implications 
Our theoretical framework and our findings contribute to the IB literature on EMNEs by 
focusing on their strategic decisions in knowledge-intensive CBAs. Although the literature has 
highlighted that the “light touch integration” is one of the primary approaches used by EMNEs 
to manage complex situations (Liu & Woywode, 2013), the extant research has provided little 
theoretical and empirical discussion on EMNEs’ ownership choices. Therefore, we 
complement this literature, which has mainly dealt with antecedents and outcomes of EMNEs’ 
CBAs (for a review, see Lebedev at al., 2015). Indeed, we delineate how the effect of 
information asymmetry perceived by acquiring MNEs from emerging economies affects the 
ownership choice decision to minimize risks and favor the learning-driven collaboration with 
the foreign firms. As such, our arguments and findings are applicable across CBAs in different 
knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries included in our definition (i.e., chemicals, 
computer equipment, electronics, transportation, and measuring instruments). Thus, we also 
extend existing research on CBAs by providing evidence on the key role of CSAs in influencing 
ownership decisions.   
Our study also extends the literature on comparative ownership advantage framework 
(Hoskisson et al., 2013; Peng, 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Yang, et al., 2011) to better explain 
behavioral differences in CBAs. We include insights from TCE to throw light on two of the 
fundamental questions in strategy and IB literature—why do firms differ and how do firms 
behave (Rumelt et al., 1994). By focusing on Chinese and Indian MNEs, we show how 
acquiring firm’s lower comparative advantage increases the information asymmetry faced in 
the knowledge-intensive CBAs and favors the partial ownership choice. Further, we offer 
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complementary theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the influence of mitigating 
factors, such as a better institutional environment and the host-country experience, and deepen 
our understanding of how these factors affect EMNEs’ ownership choices. The existing 
literature has shown contrasting evidence on the effect of institutional distance in ownership 
choice decisions, especially when comparing emerging and advanced economy MNEs (e.g. De 
Beule et al., 2014). In our specific context, we build our theoretical arguments on the idea that 
not only the mere institutional distance between the countries of the acquiring and target firm 
matters in influencing CBAs ownership choices, but also the improvement of the institutional 
conditions associated with the distance needs to be taken into consideration. We offer a more 
nuanced view by showing how such effects may be differently influenced by distinctive CSAs. 
On the same line of reasoning, we go beyond the role of host-country experience in reducing 
information asymmetry, by adding new insights on how such effect can be different 
considering the CSAs of the internationalizing MNEs.  
Finally, we provide quantitative comparative evidence of Chinese and Indian MNEs, 
complementing the existing literature which is mainly based on qualitative case studies or 
aggregated descriptive statistics (e.g. Bilgili et al., 2016; Duysters, Jacob, Lemmens & Jintian, 
2009; Sun, et al., 2012). Our study is also in line with the call for a greater engagement with 
the Asian context (Yiu et al., 2018) and more comparative research in strategy and IB (Luo et 
al., 2011; Luo & Zhang, 2016).  
Managerial Implications 
Our study offers crucial implications for managers. First, it will be important for the EMNE 
managers to understand that the level of equity decision may stem from differences in 
comparative advantages in their respective home-country environments. Thus, it may be 
crucial to train the managerial talent in such EMNEs to better equip them in managing the 
complexities and uncertainties of knowledge-intensive CBAs. Such training may entail 
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developing specific resources to deal with target selection, cross-cultural negotiation and post-
acquisition integration. Second, EMNE managers may also need to ensure that they can better 
utilize the host country-specific experience to gain more control in the new business while 
maintaining legitimacy and not appear as a threat to the target firm and the host country 
environment. In this context, it will be important for the EMNEs to create knowledge 
repositories to store host country-specific knowledge as part of organizational routines and 
effectively disseminate such knowledge while preparing new managers.  
Limitations and future research directions 
Our study has some limitations, which pave avenues for future research. First, due to the 
limitations in our dataset, we could not directly examine the effects of different country-level 
factors on EMNEs’ ownership strategies. Future research may advance this line of inquiry by 
exploring the impact of such factors on EMNEs CBA ownership decisions, which, in turn, 
should allow us to have a more nuanced understanding of this phenomenon. Second, the cross-
sectional nature and the limited timeframe of our study make not feasible to understand the 
possible evolution of the hypothesized relationships over time. In fact, Chinese and Indian 
CSAs are expected to evolve dynamically, together with their institutional attributes. 
Therefore, we suggest that future studies engage in longitudinal research design, since it would 
be interesting to compare results across different time frames. Third, we recognize the paucity 
of firm-level data involving the target companies, as it is difficult to obtain financial 
information about target firms after the acquisition (because it is often incorporated or it 
changes the name, limiting its traceability over time). Future research may overcome this 
limitation by complementing secondary information with survey data assessing directly firm-
level characteristics of both acquiring and target company that can offer additional insights to 
analyze strategic behavior in CBAs. Fourth, although we have considered Chinese and Indian 
MNEs’ acquisitions as strategic-asset seeking, we are aware that there may be other additional 
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motivations underlying these investments, e.g. market- or resource-seeking motives (Amighini 
et al., 2015; Buckley et al., 2007; Piscitello et al., 2015). As such, future research needs to 
disentangle the effect of different FDI motivations, and try to include such additional 
heterogeneities within the present line of inquiry. Relatedly, in our study, we do not consider 
the heterogeneities that may exist among the target countries (host countries). Future scholars 
should strive to understand how such differences in host country characteristics may act as 
contingencies for EMNEs’ ownership choices. Finally, even though we have focused on two 
of the major emerging economies of the Asia Pacific region, we duly acknowledge that 
extending the comparative lens to other emerging economies may enhance our understanding 
of the internationalization behaviors of EMNEs by leveraging country-specific heterogeneities 
that exist across the region.   
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Table 1. Distribution of the 244 acquisitions by acquiring company’s’ home country and main industrial sector (No., %). 
 
 
Home country 
  
Industrial sector of the acquiring firm China India Total 
 
No. % No. % No. % 
Chemicals (SIC 28) 12 15.19 115 69.70 127 52.05 
Computer equipment (SIC 35) 20 25.32 11 6.67 31 12.70 
Electronic equipment (SIC 36) 34 43.04 18 10.91 52 21.31 
Transportation (SIC 37) 5 6.33 17 10.30 22 9.02 
Instruments (SIC 38) 8 10.13 4 2.42 12 4.92 
Total 79 100.00 165 100.00 244 100.00 
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Table 2. Distribution of the 244 acquisitions by home and host country (No., %).  
  Home country     
Host country China India Total 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Advanced countries       
Australia 2 2.53 3 1.82 5 2.05 
Austria 2 2.53 0 0.00 2 0.82 
Belgium 0 0.00 5 3.03 5 2.05 
Canada 2 2.53 5 3.03 7 2.87 
Denmark 3 3.80 0 0.00 3 1.23 
France 3 3.80 6 3.64 9 3.69 
Germany 12 15.19 13 7.88 25 10.25 
Hong Kong 8 10.13 1 0.61 9 3.69 
Ireland-Rep 0 0.00 2 1.21 2 0.82 
Israel 0 0.00 2 1.21 2 0.82 
Italy 4 5.06 5 3.03 9 3.69 
Japan 5 6.33 2 1.21 7 2.87 
Luxembourg 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Netherlands 2 2.53 5 3.03 7 2.87 
Singapore 1 1.27 1 0.61 2 0.82 
South Korea 4 5.06 3 1.82 7 2.87 
Spain 2 2.53 7 4.24 9 3.69 
Sweden 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Switzerland 0 0.00 3 1.82 3 1.23 
Taiwan 1 1.27 0 0.00 1 0.41 
United Kingdom 1 1.27 19 11.52 20 8.20 
United States 20 25.32 37 22.42 57 23.36 
Emerging countries       
Argentina 0 0.00 3 1.82 3 1.23 
Brazil 1 1.27 4 2.42 5 2.05 
Bulgaria 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Chile 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
China 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Egypt 1 1.27 3 1.82 4 1.64 
Fiji 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
India 1 1.27 0 0.00 1 0.41 
Indonesia 0 0.00 2 1.21 2 0.82 
Mexico 1 1.27 5 3.03 6 2.46 
Morocco 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Nepal 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Nigeria 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Philippines 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Poland 1 1.27 2 1.21 3 1.23 
Romania 0 0.00 4 2.42 4 1.64 
South Africa 0 0.00 8 4.85 8 3.28 
Sri Lanka 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Thailand 1 1.27 1 0.61 2 0.82 
United Arab Emirates 1 1.27 1 0.61 2 0.82 
Vietnam 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Zambia 0 0.00 1 0.61 1 0.41 
Total 79 100.00 165 100.00 244 100.00 
Note: Classification of advanced and emerging economies is based on the World Economic Outlook published by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem 
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 Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables employed in the analysis 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1)Equity ownership 1                  
(2)GDP 0.109 1                 
(3)GDP difference 0.086 0.315 1                
(4)Host country_EU 0.124 0.021 0.259 1               
(5)Host country_USA 0.030 0.522 0.078 -0.430 1              
(6)Host country_other emerging -0.046 -0.445 -0.364 -0.350 -0.284 1             
(7)Uncertainty avoidance dist. -0.075 -0.189 0.050 0.125 -0.415 0.162 1            
(8)Language distance -0.120 -0.165 0.257 0.145 -0.320 0.139 0.575 1           
(9)Religion distance 0.054 0.321 -0.021 0.197 0.081 -0.136 0.060 -0.179 1          
(10)Bankrupt target 0.087 0.092 0.027 0.072 -0.005 -0.101 -0.037 -0.035 0.032 1         
(11)Public target -0.317 0.087 0.057 -0.187 0.155 -0.080 -0.029 -0.030 -0.038 0.073 1        
(12)SOE -0.209 0.021 0.074 0.027 -0.057 -0.047 0.240 0.177 -0.052 -0.038 0.073 1       
(13)Size -0.185 0.094 0.100 0.138 0.003 -0.008 0.119 0.130 0.066 0.085 0.228 0.252 1      
(14)Industry relatedness 0.042 0.015 -0.090 -0.063 0.060 0.004 -0.094 -0.125 0.048 0.016 -0.039 -0.133 -0.040 1     
(15)Cash payment 0.008 0.072 0.006 -0.083 -0.025 -0.065 0.095 -0.083 0.011 0.152 0.222 -0.055 0.058 -0.034 1    
(16)Institutional distance 0.020 0.382 0.170 -0.044 0.435 -0.451 -0.503 -0.373 -0.028 0.050 0.107 -0.068 -0.105 0.009 0.091 1   
(17)International experience  0.119 -0.002 -0.021 -0.040 0.061 0.100 -0.130 -0.223 0.166 0.077 0.020 -0.054 0.300 0.069 0.012 -0.104 1  
(18)Chinese -0.251 0.143 0.307 -0.014 0.032 -0.205 0.204 0.511 -0.399 0.004 0.159 0.283 0.158 -0.172 0.060 0.206 -0.373 1 
No. of Obs.  244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 
Mean 84.298 28.095 1.845 0.377 0.234 0.209 1.833 -0.643 1.138 0.037 0.107 0.367 5.931 0.742 0.230 19.330 0.471 0.324 
Std. Dev.  27.940 1.710 0.497 0.486 0.424 0.407 2.146 1.298 0.270 0.189 0.309 0.189 1.618 0.439 0.421 9.115 0.500 0.469 
Min 6 21.335 0 0 0 0 0 -2.433 -1.292 0 0 0 0.137 0 0 0.7 0 0 
Max 100 30.451 2.728 1 1 1 7.892 0.526 1.528 1 1 1 11.275 1 1 38.7 1 1 
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Table 4. Tobit regression results (Dependent variable = Equity ownership). 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
Constant 57.67*** 56.71*** 55.21*** 
 (4.329) (4.188) (4.051) 
GDP 6.019 6.985* 8.385** 
 (4.154) (4.041) (3.873) 
GDP difference 23.02** 19.99* 20.25* 
 (10.14) (10.19) (10.30) 
Host country_EU 28.99* 34.87** 32.86* 
 (15.33) (17.64) (17.19) 
Host country_USA 17.51 16.86 14.77 
 (20.42) (20.76) (20.59) 
Host country_other emerging 20.75 29.02 30.22 
 (15.73) (23.37) (22.92) 
Uncertainty avoidance distance 3.459 4.375 4.433 
 (2.735) (2.934) (2.918) 
Language distance -11.79** -9.399 -3.455 
 (5.751) (5.901) (6.102) 
Religion distance -25.92 -29.89* -49.22** 
 (18.64) (17.94) (19.12) 
Bankrupt target 72.34*** 67.52*** 60.74*** 
 (20.58) (20.44) (22.07) 
Public target -55.95*** -52.58*** -46.85*** 
 (14.28) (14.62) (15.33) 
SOE -54.02*** -49.33*** -34.98* 
 (16.18) (16.45) (18.05) 
Size -5.368* -7.930** -6.556** 
 (2.887) (3.146) (3.116) 
Industry relatedness -8.099 -6.408 -4.809 
 (11.65) (11.49) (10.90) 
Cash payment 1.456 0.874 1.515 
 (11.23) (11.19) (10.74) 
Crisis 0.0832 0.341 3.449 
 (11.44) (11.01) (10.75) 
Institutional distance  0.593 1.031 
  (1.014) (1.054) 
International experience   24.43** 18.18* 
  (10.64) (10.00) 
Chinese   -38.87** 
   (15.46) 
Sectorial dummies Included Included Included 
Observations  244 244 244 
F 5.97*** 5.98*** 5.83*** 
Log likelihood (LL) -498.444 -495.795 -495.538 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by acquiring firm.  
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Table 5. Split sample analysis: Tobit regression results (Dependent variable = Equity ownership). 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
 Full sample China India 
Constant 58.83*** 51.77*** 57.45*** 
 (4.246) (4.989) (5.938) 
GDP 6.030 23.62** 2.349 
 (4.256) (9.172) (4.853) 
GDP difference 15.28 -2.952 31.58*** 
 (9.988) (17.05) (11.25) 
Host country_EU 34.05* 53.63** 36.04* 
 (17.66) (26.41) (20.36) 
Host country_USA 16.61 -33.92 40.29* 
 (21.38) (34.15) (24.03) 
Host country_other emerging 28.97 101.8* 19.71 
 (23.74) (51.68) (27.03) 
Uncertainty avoidance distance 1.139 3.768 1.413 
 (2.968) (5.171) (3.340) 
Public target -47.41*** -52.81*** -28.03 
 (14.42) (18.04) (26.49) 
Size -10.50*** -12.09*** -3.440 
 (3.252) (4.133) (4.953) 
Industry relatedness -2.646 12.05 -16.07 
 (11.23) (14.74) (14.71) 
Crisis 1.102 -6.902 4.009 
 (10.90) (18.35) (14.00) 
Institutional distance 0.973 4.616** 0.251 
 (1.046) (2.244) (1.201) 
International experience  30.17*** 37.48** 8.645 
 (10.63) (17.90) (12.94) 
Sectorial dummies Included Included Included 
N 244 79 165 
F 5.06*** 3.64*** 2.54*** 
Log likelihood (LL) -502.619 -209.391 -282.576 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by acquiring firm. 
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Table 6. Ordered probit regression results (Dependent variable = Equity ownership category). 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
Cut 1 3.486* 4.085* 4.625** 
 (2.102) (2.227) (2.210) 
Cut2 4.167** 4.784** 5.342** 
 (2.105) (2.235) (2.212) 
GDP 0.172** 0.194** 0.231*** 
 (0.0814) (0.0809) (0.0786) 
GDP difference 0.328* 0.273 0.287 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.200) 
Host country_EU 0.516* 0.609* 0.600* 
 (0.296) (0.338) (0.341) 
Host country_USA 0.175 0.142 0.104 
 (0.379) (0.389) (0.395) 
Host country_other emerging 0.501 0.615 0.686 
 (0.318) (0.465) (0.468) 
Uncertainty avoidance distance 0.0682 0.0830 0.0855 
 (0.0512) (0.0566) (0.0582) 
Language distance -0.219** -0.178* -0.0652 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.111) 
Religion distance -0.482 -0.586* -0.979** 
 (0.352) (0.342) (0.382) 
Bankrupt target 1.444*** 1.354*** 1.262*** 
 (0.372) (0.372) (0.393) 
Public target -1.124*** -1.087*** -1.022*** 
 (0.274) (0.285) (0.295) 
SOE -1.195*** -1.118*** -0.895** 
 (0.390) (0.409) (0.423) 
Size -0.0895 -0.143** -0.114* 
 (0.0554) (0.0629) (0.0635) 
Industry relatedness -0.128 -0.104 -0.0787 
 (0.218) (0.220) (0.215) 
Cash payment 0.0131 0.0120 0.0198 
 (0.200) (0.202) (0.200) 
Crisis 0.0748 0.0729 0.132 
 (0.207) (0.204) (0.202) 
Institutional distance  0.00976 0.0197 
  (0.0184) (0.0198) 
International experience   0.486** 0.371* 
  (0.196) (0.193) 
Chinese   -0.758** 
   (0.309) 
Sectorial dummies Included Included Included 
Observations  244 244 244 
Wald 2 79.06*** 92.79*** 102.84*** 
Log likelihood (LL) -174.934 -171.964 -169.429 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by acquiring firm. 
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Table 7. Split sample analysis: Ordered probit regression results (Dependent variable = Equity 
ownership category). 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) 
 All sample China India 
Cut 1 3.574 20.46*** 2.001 
 (2.313) (6.776) (2.711) 
Cut 2 4.231* 21.04*** 2.811 
 (2.315) (6.786) (2.698) 
GDP 0.167** 0.721*** 0.0945 
 (0.0797) (0.210) (0.0961) 
GDP difference 0.182 -0.00581 0.419** 
 (0.176) (0.366) (0.211) 
Host country_EU 0.557* 0.841 0.708* 
 (0.320) (0.545) (0.406) 
Host country_USA 0.143 -1.607** 0.654 
 (0.387) (0.779) (0.474) 
Host country_other emerging 0.566 2.054* 0.517 
 (0.455) (1.095) (0.533) 
Uncertainty avoidance distance 0.0186 0.0117 0.0373 
 (0.0510) (0.114) (0.0572) 
Public target -0.928*** -1.443*** -0.523 
 (0.267) (0.369) (0.443) 
Size -0.194*** -0.246*** -0.0816 
 (0.0610) (0.0905) (0.0882) 
Industry relatedness -0.0213 0.276 -0.280 
 (0.204) (0.321) (0.268) 
Crisis 0.0860 -0.304 0.195 
 (0.197) (0.383) (0.248) 
Institutional distance 0.0151 0.0961* 0.00568 
 (0.0186) (0.0491) (0.0213) 
International experience  0.570*** 0.893** 0.190 
 (0.190) (0.363) (0.236) 
Sectorial dummies Included Included Included 
Observations  244 79 165 
Wald 2 61.16*** 61.00*** 24.73** 
Log likelihood (LL) -179.898 -59.272 -108.430 
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by acquiring firm. 
 
 
 
 
